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THE SNePS FAMILY  
STUART C. SHAPIRO AND WILLIAM J. R.APAPORT * 
Department of Computer Sci nce and Center for Cognitive Science 
226 Bell Hall, Buffalo, NY 14260-7022, U.S.A. 
Abst ract  - -  SNePS, the Semantic Network Processing System, is an intensional propositional 
semantic network that has been designed to be the mind of a computational cognitive agent. In this
article, the main features of SNePSare sketched, its antecedents are discussed, and some example 
current uses are described. 
1. MOTIVAT ION 
SNePS, the Semantic Network Processing System [1,2], has been designed to be a system for 
representing the b liefs of a natural-language-using i telligent system (a "cognitive agent"). It 
has always been the intention that a SNePS-based "knowledge base" would ultimately be built, 
not by a programmer or knowledge ngineer entering representations of knowledge in some formal 
language or data entry system, but by a human informing it using a natural language (NL) 
(generally supposed to be English), or by the system reading books or articles that had been 
prepared for human readers. Because of this motivation, the criteria for the development of 
SNePS have included: it should be able to represent anything and everything expressible in NL; 
it should be able to represent generic, as well as specific information; it should be able to use 
the generic and the specific information to reason and infer information implied by what it has 
been told; it cannot count on any particular order among the pieces of information it is given; it 
must continue to act reasonably even if the information it is given includes circular definitions, 
recursive rules, and inconsistent information. 
2. MAIN CONCEPTS 
The entities to be represented in SNePS include all entities a cognitive agent can think about 
or have beliefs about. This includes individual objects, classes of objects, people, properties, 
abstractions, actions, times, and propositions, both specific and generic (generic propositions 
being rules). This set of entities is not the same as the set of objects in the world, nor can the 
entities be mapped one-to-one onto the set of objects in the world. An agent may believe in the 
existence of two entities that, in fact, are the same object in the world; an agent may believe 
that what are, in fact, two objects in the world are one ntity; an agent may have beliefs about 
non-existent, fictional, and even impossible ntities. In the past, we have called such entities 
"intensions," intensional entities, . . . .  intensional objects," and even "concepts" and "intensional 
concepts." Henceforth, we will call them "entities," or, for emphasis, "mental entities" (cf. [2,3]). 
The SNePS representation formalism consists of nodes and labeled, directed arcs. Nodes 
comprise the terms of the formalism; arcs are grammatical punctuation like the parentheses and 
commas in the standard syntax of predicate calculus. Every entity represented in SNePS is 
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represented by a node. Even nodes that represent propositions and nodes that represent rules 
are terms, so that SNePS can represent beliefs about beliefs and rules about rules without limit. 
There are four types of nodes in SNePS: base nodes, variable nodes, molecular nodes, and 
pattern nodes. Base nodes and variable nodes have no arcs emanating from them. A base node 
represents some particular entity that is conceptually different from the entity represented by 
any other node. Additional properties of the entity are assertionally determined (see [4]) by 
the rest of the network connected to its node. (Isolated nodes cannot be created.) Variable 
nodes also have no arcs emanating from them, and represent arbitrary individuals, propositions, 
etc., again as determined by the rest of the network. Molecular and pattern nodes have arcs 
emanating from them and are structurally determined (see [4]) by those arcs, the nodes they go 
to, the arcs emanating from them, etc. Molecular nodes represent propositions, including rules, 
or "structured individuals." Pattern nodes are similar to open sentences or functional terms with 
free variables in standard predicate logic. Every node has an identifier, which uniquely identifies 
it. Base nodes may have identifiers determined by the user. All other nodes have identifiers 
created by the system. 
The current version of SNePS, SNePS 2.1, contains SNeBR, the SNePS Belief Revision sys- 
tem [5] as a standard feature. Therefore, there is always a "current context" specified, which 
consists of a set of hypotheses asserted to the system by the user, and a "current belief space," 
consisting of the current context and all propositions o far derived from them. Nodes repre- 
senting propositions currently asserted in the current belief space (either hypotheses or derived 
propositions), are indicated by the system's printing an exclamation mark at the end of their 
identifiers. These represent the current beliefs of the cognitive agent. 
The set of arc labels used to structure the network is determined by the user, so that SNePS 
can be used to experiment with different conceptual structures. However, since SNIP, the SNePS 
Inference Package, is a standard part of SNePS, and SNIP must be able to interpret rules properly, 
the arc labels used to represent rules, and the specific representation f rules have been determined 
by the designers. 
Examples of the 2D notation of SNePS are postponed until additional concepts are introduced 
in the next section. 
3. H ISTORY AND VARIANTS 
3.1. SAMENLAQ 
The earliest antecedent of SNePS was SAMENLAQ [6,7]. The key ideas are listed in the 
abstract of [6]: 
The system is capable of three types of learning: by being explicitly told facts; by 
deducing facts implied by a number of previously stored facts; by induction from a 
given set of examples. The memory structure is a net built up of binary relations, a 
relation being a label on the edge joining two nodes. The relations, however, are also 
nodes and so can be related to other nodes which may also be used as relations. Most 
significantly, a relation can be related to one or more alternate definitions in terms of 
compositions of other relations and restrictions on intermediate nodes. 
As indicated by this quote, both entities and relations were represented in SAMENLAQ by 
nodes. The information stored about relations was mostly information putting them in relational 
classes, and a connection to rules by which instances of the relationship could be deduced. The 
rules were not as general as allowed by predicate calculus, rather being from the relational calculus 
and forming a subset of the "path-based" inference rules later allowed in SNePS [8]. 
SAMENLAQ II [7] differed from the earlier version mainly in allowing the rules to be recursive, 
and allowing all instances of a relationship to be found even when some of them were explicitly 
stored in the net while others had to be deduced. The 2D notation for SAMENLAQ is shown in 
Figure 1. 
The nodes are MAX, JOHN, D&VID, MM.~, F~UIV, H£S.GRNDER, IS.PARENT.OF, and 
IS.CIIILD.0F(IHV), the first three representing individuals, MhLE representing a property, and 
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:HILD.0F(INV)) 
Figure I. A 2D picture of a SAMENLAQ network showing the Lnformation 
that Max, John, and David axe male, that Max is the parent of John and 
David, and that the parent-of relation is the converse of the child-of relation. 
Based on [6, p. 49]. 
the last four representing relations. The ovals labeled/1, /2,  /3, /4, and /5  are just collec- 
tors of sets of nodes, so that, for example, the arc going from HhX through IS. PhRENT. OF to /2 ,  
together with the arcs f rom/2 to JOHN and DAVID represent the two relationships, Max is the 
parent of John and Max is the parent of David. The arc from IS. PhREIT. OF through EQUIV to /S  
together with e arc from/5 to IS .CHILl) .0F(INV) represents he fact that the parent-of relation 
is the converse of the child-of relation. Actually, this piece of information was only used in the 
direction z IS .CHILD.OF  y =~ y IS .PARENT.OF  x. Therefore, in SAMENLAQ II, EQUIV was 
changed to IMPI~Y. There was no 2D notation for the relationship between IS.CHILI). 0F(IliV) 
and IS.CHILD .OF. Neither was there a 2D notation for the rest of the rule syntax. SAMENLAQ 
and SAMENLAQ II were implemented in SNOBOL3. 
3.2. MENTAL 
3.2.1. Shapiro's Version 
MENTAL [9,10] was a question answering system that used the MENS knowledge represen- 
tation formalism, and was part of the MIND system [11]. The two major advances of MENS over 
SAMENLAQ were the representation f statements (relationships, propositions) by nodes, and 
the representation f rules by nodes. 
SAMENLAQ had statements represented by three nodes and an arc that tied them together 
in the correct order. The move that allowed the representation f statements in MENS was to 
use one node for the statement, and three differently labeled arcs from the statement ode to the 
three SAMENLAQ nodes. Following a suggestion from Martin Kay, FiUmore's Case Grammar 
Theory [12] was used as a model, and the number of labeled arcs was increased from three to an 
arbitrary number, one for the verb and one for each case. 
Figure 2 shows an example MENS network for the information i  the sentences: 
(1) Jane saw (2) John hit Henry. 
(3) Henry loves Jane. 
(4) John loves Jane. 
(5) Narcissus loves himseff. 
(6) Jane loves John. 
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F 
JAN] 
Figure 2. AMENS network based on [I0, Figs. 2-4]. 
The nodes (which were called "items" in the original papers) labeled with numbers, a simplifi- 
cation of the original node labeling scheme, represent the corresponding propositions. Each arc 
has two labels, one for each direction. For example, the arc from node i to node 2 is labeled 0, 
while the arc from node 2 to node I is labeled *0. 
Since one proposition can be the object of another, it is necessary to have some means of 
noting which nodes represent propositions that are asserted (as opposed to merely used) in the 
system. This was done by the "independent statement flag," which "is a single pointer which, 
when present, always points to the same item... [it] indicates that the item it is attached to 
represents some information that has been alleged to be true. Two other cases are possible--the 
information may have been alleged to be false.., or no allegation may have been made as to its 
truth value" [9, p. 106]. 
A conscious decision was made not to use class membership or any other particular relation 
for the basic structure of the network, but to allow rules as representationally complete as the 
predicate calculus to be represented and used. This required techniques for representing variables, 
logical connectives, and quantifiers. It was decided to use nodes to represent variables, even 
though this would seem counter to the notion that every node represents some conceptual entity. 
(The representation and semantics of variables in SNePS remains a research topic to this day.) 
It was also decided to use nodes to represent quantiflers and connectives, even though their 
conceptual status was unclear. (This was changed in the next version. See below.) 
Variables were allowed to range over all entities represented by nodes, but not over relations 
represented by arcs, because, "As Quine says, 'The ontology to which one's use of language 
commits him comprises simply the objects that he treats as falling.., within the range of values of 
his variables.' [13, p. 118]" [10, p. 518], and, although this allows the represestation of Russell's 
and other paradoxes, "this possibility will be accepted. We make no type distinctions among 
the items and impose no restraints in item existence, leaving the avoidance of paradoxes the 
responsibility of the human informant" [ibid.]. 
IC 
I *OBJ IMAL E 
I 
,S 
~al VERB JAG 
*VERB I 
MEMBER 
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OBJ AIENT' ViRB' AIENT' ViRB' I [ ,s 
[*VERBI ] E I CHILD-OF OBJ I AGENT I V B 
I , 
I I *VERB 
I SON-OF 
*VBIx *AGENT I
Figure 3. MENS representations of "If a male is a child of someone, he is the 
son of that person." (Based on [10, p. 519-520].) 
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The logical connectives included were: NOT, IMPLIES, IFF, AND, OR, and MUTIMP. 
"MUTIMP stands for mutual implication. It is a predicate with an arbitrary number of argu- 
ments and says that its arguments mutually imply each other by pairs (are pairwise quivalent)" 
[10, footnote, p. 519]. A node representing a non-atomic proposition had an arc labeled OP to the 
connective node, and one of the following sets of arcs: an arc labeled ARG to the one argument of 
NOT; arcs labeled ARG1 and ARG2 to the two arguments of IMPLIES and IFF; an arc labeled 
MARG to each of the arbitrary number of arguments of AND, OR, and MUTIMP. 
Restricted quantification was used to represent quantified propositions. A node representing 
a quantified proposition had an arc labeled Q to the quantifier node, an arc labeled VB to the 
variable being bound, an arc labeled R to the restriction, and an arc labeled S to the scope. Both 
the restriction and the scope could be arbitrary propositions with the variable free. Thus, this 
was more general than the usual notion of restricted quantification, which allows restriction only 
by class (a unary predicate). Restricted quantification actually obviates most uses of IMPLIES. 
Propositions containing either quantifiers or connectives were termed "deduction rules" be- 
cause they act like derived rules of inference in other inference schemes. Figure 3 shows the 
MENS representation f the deduction rule, "If a male is a child of someone, he is the son of that 
person." 
MENTAL was partially implemented in PL/I, and ran interactively on an IBM System/360. 
The implementation ncluded "all the procedures for storing information into the data struc- 
ture, as well as all those for explicit retrieval and some of those for implicit retrieval [infer- 
ence]" [10, p. 512]. 
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Figure 4. The MIND semantic network representation f "Jane saw John hit 





3.2.2. Kay's Version 
Although discussing the same project, Kay [11] gave a description of the semantic network 
of the MIND system that differed in some details from that given above, and itfered even 
more in the look of the 2D notation. Figure 4 shows this notation for the representation of
the information in the sentence "Jane saw John hit Henry." The arcs labeled TV pointing to 
node 4 are the independent s atement flags mentioned above. Note that Kay distinguished the 
proposition that John hit Henry from the act of John's hitting Henry, and made the latter the 
object of Jane's seeing. 
Instead of representing quantifiers explicitly, Kay used a SkSlem function technique where free 
variables were assumed to be universally quantified, and existentially quantified variables had an 
arc labeled F to the universally quantified variables they depended on. For example, Figure 5 
shows how he would represent the rule, "Every boy owns a dog." Notice that both the dog and 
the particular owning act are represented as Sk61em functions of the boy. 
3.3. SNePS 79 
When a revised version of MENS/MENTAL was implemented in Lisp, its name was changed to 
SNePS (Semantic Network Processing System), and, when SNePS was later revised, the original 
version was retroactively named SNePS 79 in honor of the date of publication of [1], the main 
reference for SNePS. 
SNePS 79 had "three kinds of arcs: descending, ascending, a d auziliary. For each relation 
represented by descending arcs, there is a converse relation represented by ascending arcs and vice 








(~ CLASS Q 
Figure 5. The MIND semantic network representation f "Every boy owns a 
dog." Based on [11, p. 182-184]. 
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versa... Auxiliary arcs are used for hanging nonnodal information on nodes and for typing the 
nodes" [1, p. 180]. Besides base, variable, molecular, and pattern nodes, SNePS 79 had auziliary 
nodes, which "are connected to each other and to other nodes only by auxiliary arcs. Auxiliary 
nodes do not represent concepts but are used by the SNePS system or the SNePS user to type 
nonauxiliary nodes or to maintain a reference to one or more nonauxiliary nodes" [ibi~. Addi- 
tionally, there were temporary variable, molecular, and pattern odes. Temporary molecular and 
pattern odes '~aave no ascending arcs coming into them from the nodes they dominate. Tempo- 
rary nodes are not placed on any permanent system list and are garbage-collected when no longer 
referenced. They are invisible to all the semantic network retrieval operations... Temporary nodes 
are used to build patterns of network structures, which can be matched against he network but 
do not match themselves" [1, p. 181]. Figure 6 shows various kinds of nodes and arcs. In that fig- 
ure, the arcs labeled }IF2~BER and CLASS are descending arcs, those labeled }l~lBgR- and CLASS- 
, .  MEMBE 
CLA qBER 
ASS- i 
• VAL ~V / VAR :VAR :_ L 
x - . . . . .  ~ . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . .  T "q  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Q I , ,~  . . . . . .  Y 
Figure 6. 2D notation of SNePS 79, showing various kinds of nodes and arcs. 
Based on [1, Figure 1]. 
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are ascending arcs, and those labeled :VAL, :VAR, and :SVAR are auxiliary arcs. The nodes 
MOBY-DICK and WHALE are base nodes, Vl is a variable node, M1 is a molecular node, P2 is a 
pattern node, Q1 is a temporary variable node, 2"2 is a temporary pattern node, and X, Y, and T 
are auxiliary nodes. All variable nodes in the network have :VAR auxiliary arcs to the auxiliary 
node T. Pattern nodes have : SVAR auxiliary arcs to the free variable nodes they dominate. These 
auxiliary arcs and nodes are not normally shown in SNePS 79 diagrams. Neither are ascending 
arcs, since there is an ascending arc for every descending arc except when it would go to a tem- 
porary node. The SNePS 79 user could name the ascending arc anything, but we typically used 
the name of the descending arc with "-" appended. 
In SNePS, we no longer represented quantifiers and logical connectives explicitly as nodes. 
Instead, a quantifier was represented as an arc from the node representing the scope of quan- 
tification to the node representing the bound variable, and logical connectives were represented 
implicitly by particular structures of arcs emanating from the node representing the non-atomic 
formula. The logical connectives used in SNePS 79 all took one or two sets of propositions as 
arguments. They are: 
or -enta i lment :  {A1,... ,An}V--* {C1,... ,Cm} is true just in case each Ai entails each Cj. It 
is represented by an AIIT arc to each Ai and a CQ arc to each Cj. 
and-enta i lment :  {A1,... ,An}A-* {C1,... ,Cm} is true just in case each Cj is entailed by the 
conjunction of all the Ai. It is represented by an kANT arc to each Ai and a CQ arc to each 
and-or :  n~(~{P1,--.,Pn} is true just in case at least i and at most j of the P are true. It 
is represented by a HIS auxiliary arc to the auxiliary node i ,  a MAX auxiliary arc to the 
auxiliary node j , and ARG arcs to each of the Ps. 
thresh:  ne i{P1, . . .  ,Pn} is true just in case either fewer than i of the P are true, or else they 
all are. It is represented by a THRESH auxiliary arc to the auxiliary node i ,  and AItG arcs 
to each of the Ps. 
The Universal (Existential) Quantifier was represented by an arc labeled AVB (gPB) from the 
node representing the scope of the quantifier to the variable node being bound. Restricted 
quantification was eliminated because it was felt to be unnecessary, an opinion since reversed. 
SNIP [14-16], the SNePS Inference Package included as a part of SNePS 79, implemented the 
elimination rules for all of the quantifiers and connectives (deriving either a positive or a negative 
proposition), and the introduction rule for and-or. SNIP could use any rule either for backwards 
chaining, or for forward chaining, depending on whether the user asked a question or added new 
data (see [17]). 
Later, the numerical quantifier (see [18]), path-based inference (see [8,19,20]), function nodes 
(see [21]), and default rules (see [2, p. 285-287] and [22]) were added. The numerical quantifier 
is a way of storing and reasoning with statements of the form "Between 3 and 5 people are in the 
meeting" or "Every person has exactly one mother and exactly one father." Path-based inference 
is a way of specifying and using rules that infer an arc between two nodes from the existence of 
a path of arcs between those two nodes, and allows inheritance rules to be specified. Function 
nodes were a form of procedural (semantic) attachment, where the instances of a proposition were 
computed rather than being inferred, and where forward inference could trigger action. Default 
rules were representing by allowing default consequences on and-entailment and or-entailment 
rules, and were implemented by having SNIP try to derive the negation of the default consequent, 
and assert he consequent only if the negation were not derivable. 
Since 1 ~11{P} means the assertion of P, the independent s atement pointer was no longer 
needed. Instead, every propositional node (a molecular node representing a proposition) with 
no descending arc coming into it was taken to represent a proposition asserted in the network 
(believed by the cognitive agent). For example, Figure 7 shows the SNePS 79 representation 
of "Jane believes that John didn't hit Henry, but he did," using the representation f atomic 
propositions used in [1]. Node M1 represents the proposition that John hit Henry, node N2 uses 
and-or to represent the proposition that John didn't hit Henry, while node M4 uses and-or to 
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0 ~ . . . . . . .  ) . . . . . .  0 
MAX MIN ~ .... 
OBJECT 
Figure 7. A SNePS 79 representation of "Jane believes that John didn't hit 
Henry, but he did." Based on [1, Figure 17]. 
represent the proposition that, indeed, John hit Henry. Node MS represents he proposition that 
Jane believes the proposition represented by node M2. The technique whereby the asserted nodes 
are precisely the non-dominated nodes pecifies that the cognitive agent believes the propositions 
represented by nodes M3 and M4. 
In [1], it was explicitly stated that one could reuse a molecular node, as node M1 is being used 
both by node M2 and node M4, or one could duplicate it by having another node with the same 
set of arcs to the same set of nodes. Later experience and thought convinced us that such node 
duplication should not be done, but SNePS 79 never enforced that decision. 
SNePS 79 was implemented in a series of dialects of Lisp running on a series of different 
computers at Indiana University and SUNY at Buffalo. 
3.4. SNePS 2.0 
SNePS 2.0 was a complete redesign and reimplementation of SNePS in COMMON LISP using an 
abstract data type approach explicated in [23]. It also incorporated theoretical decisions that had 
been made during experiments with SNePS 79. Some of the prominent differences of SNePS 2.0 
from SNePS 79 were: 
* Auxiliary nodes and function nodes were eliminated as not making conceptual sense. Func- 
tion nodes are being replaced by a new theory of acting [24-26]. 
• An assertion tag was added to each node. The assertions of the system (beliefs of the 
cognitive agent) were now the set of nodes with the assertion tags set on. This eliminated 
much use of the and-or assertion operator, which had the additional problem of it's not 
being clear what the conceptual difference was between, e.g., nodes M1 and M4 in Figure 7. 
Figure 8 shows the SNePS 2.0 version of Figure 7. Asserted nodes are indicated by their 
identifiers being printed with "!" appended. Because of the elimination of auxiliary nodes, 
the parameters of the and-or are now regular nodes, but this will be changed in the future. 
• Temporary nodes were eliminated, since an unasserted permanent node could be used to 
represent a proposition the cognitive agent is contemplating. 
• The system will not build a new node that dominates the same structure as an already 
extant node, thus enforcing the Uniqueness Principle. 
CAMWA 23:2-.5-0 
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_~~ VERE, ~CT 
Figure 8. The SNePS 2.0 version of Figure 7. Asserted nodes are indicated by 
"!" appended to their identifiers. 
The Unique Variable Binding Rule, according to which two variables in one rule cannot be 
instantiated to the same term (see [27]), was implemented and enforced by SNIP 2.0. 
The Universal Quantifier is only supported if on a proposition whose main connective is one 
of the entailments, thus enforcing a kind of restricted quantifier. (The Existential Quantifier 
has not yet been reimplemented.) The arc used to represent the Universal Quantifier is 
FORALL instead of AVB. 
Thresh was given an additional parameter. ,~(~i {P1,..., P,} is true just in case either fewer 
than i or more than j of the P are true. The arc TII~SHlilX goes to j .  
Auxiliary arcs were liminated. Ascending arcs are no longer discussed--they are just 
considered to be following descending arcs backwards. 
Default consequences, the Existential Quantifier, and the Numerical Quantifier were not 
yet reimplemented. 
3.5. SNePS 2.1 
SNePS 2.1 is SNePS 2.0 with the inclusion of SNeBR, the SNePS Belief Revision System [5]. 
The significance of this was discussed above in Section 2. In brief summary, the assertion flag was 
replaced by a pointer to the context in which the proposition is either an hypothesis or a derived 
proposition, so the appearance of the "!" suffix becomes dependent on the current context, which 
can be changed by the user. 
If a contradiction ever arises in SNePS 2.1, by the assertion of a proposition and its negation 
in the same context, the system will engage the user in a dialogue to identify the culprit and 
remove it from the context. 
SNePS 2.1 can use the hypothetical reasoning facilities of SNeBR [28] to implement he 
entailment introduction rules and the rule of Universal Generalization. 
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Figure 9. SNePS/CASSIE representstion f the Lord's Prayer. 
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b0 = CASSIE's concept of the current time ("now") 
b l  = CASSIE's serf-concept ("1 ~) 
b2 --- CASSIE's concept of God 
])3 ---- CASSIE's concept of God's Kingdom 
I>4 = CASSIE's concept of the time at which her act of praying ends 
b5 = CASSIE's concept of the time at which her prayers hould take effect 
ml  ~- I (CASSIE) perform act m2 
mY. ---- the action, he~'~i=~ now and enelin E at time I>4, of praying that m9 and m12 and m16 
(N.B.: the box around m9, m12, and m16 is a sIwrthand to avoid hsvlng to draw munerous 
copies of AGENT-ACT and ACTION-OBJECT-STME-ETIME case frames pointing to each 
of m9, m12, and m16) 
m4 -- b2 is my Father (i.e., b2 is the object that stands in the Father relatkm to the possessor b l )  
m6 --- b2 is named 'Jehovah' (N.B.: if CASSIE were Jewish, then ml0  would not have a LEX arc 
pointing to 'Jehovah', since that name should not be uttered; of course, if CASSIE were 
Jewish, she wouldn't he saying the Lord's Prayer in the first place]) 
m7 -~ b2 is in heaven 
m9 = ml0  (should) be hallowed, starting st  time b5 (N.B.: it is not b2 who is prsyed to be hallowed, 
but ml0,  viz., b2's n4me) 
m12 -- b3 (should) come, starting at time h5 
m13 ~ I)3 is b2's kingdom 
m16 -- b2's will (should) be done on earth as (i.e., in the same way that) it is done in heaven, starting 
at t ime b5 
m17 ~- b4, the ending time of the praying, is some time after "now" 
m18 -- b5 is some time after the praying ends at I>4 
Figure 10. Interpretation M the nodes in Figure 9. 
4. EXAMPLES OF USE 
4.1. "Standard Tricky ~ Example 
Probably because so much linguistic work was done by missionaries working to translate 
the Christian Bible into "native" languages, the Christian "Lord's Prayer" is often taken to be a 
"standard tricky" example of linguistic analysis. In this section, we show a powible representation 
of that example using SNePS/CASSIE case frames. For those unfamiliar with it, one version of 
the "Lord's Prayer" is the following: 
Our Father which art in heaven, 
Hallowed be thy name. 
Thy kingdom come. 
Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven. 
Now, CASSIE is not yet a poet, so let us instead consider the following, more prosaic, version: 
Our Father, who is in heaven, 
[I pray that] your name [will] be hallowed, 
[I pray that] your kingdom [will] come, 
[I pray that] your will [will] be done on earth [in the same way that] it is [done] in 
heaven. 
Note that in this version we have interpolated some phrases to clarify (or make more under- 
standable) the syntax. Clearly, some of these interpolations are, in fact, interpretations. An even 
more streamlined version, which is the one we choose to represent, is this: 
I pray that our Father (who is in heaven)'s name will be hallowed, kingdom will come, 
and will will be done on earth in the same way that it is done in heaven. 
The representation is shown in Figure 9, and a key to the figure is given in Figure 10. The 
representation is incomplete: we have used the linguist's triangles to hide the structure of node 
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Figure 11. Sample rule node for Lord's Prayer network: For all vl, v2, v3, if 
v3 is a v2 of v l ,  then  v3 is a v2. 
m16, about which we shall say more, and there would also be rules such as those in Figure Ii. 
Also, the representation of 'in heaven' is a vastly oversimplified version of the representation 
described in Yuhan [78 I. Yuhan's theory would interpret the sentence 'My Father is in heaven' 
by a semantic network containing the following information: 
Due to the existing act of my Father, 
the Figure Object, individual b2 
where 
b2 is the Father of b l  
and 
b2 is named Jehovah 
was BE-LOCated 
at a place that has a Spatial Relation of "in" 
to the Ground Object, individual m8 
where m8 is named heaven. 
In Figure 9, we have represented the phrase 'thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven' 
as if it were interpreted to mean "the manner in which thy will is done on earth be the same 
as the manner in which thy will is done in heaven" (and we have omitted the details of the 
representation f "the manner in which thy will is done lat place X) ' ) .  There are a myriad of 
hermeneutic, representational, nd methodological issues here. On the hermeneutic side, there 
is the question of how best to interpret he original phrase. For instance, the interpretation we 
have outlined is that the phrase asserts an equivalence. But that loses a certain asymmetry in 
the original. Perhaps a better alternative would be one of the following: 
1 . . . .  that all properties of the way in which our Father's will is done in heaven be properties 
of the way in which it is done on earth. 
2 . . . .  that Vx[x is our Father's will in heaven --* x is our Father's will on earth] 
3. It is the case that our Father's will is done in heaven, and I pray that it be done on earth, 
and I pray that (one of the above). 
But this leads to the methodological issue, which is the most important: it is not the job of the 
knowledge-representation researcher to do Biblical exegesis. Once an interpretation is chosen, 
however, the KR researcher can decide how best to represent it. Perhaps it can be represented 
using already existing case frames; but perhaps new case frames, and attendant rules characteriz- 
ing their inferential behavior, need to be developed (with the help of linguists and philosophers). 
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5. SOME CURRENT USES OF SNEPS 
In this section, we briefly summarize some current research projects that are using SNePS. 
5.1. Planning and Acting 
SNACTor, the SNePS acting system [25,26,29,30], is being developed to model in SNePS 
rational cognitive agents who can also plan and act. The modeled agent should be able to 
understand natural language; reason about beliefs; act rationally based on its beliefs; plan; 
recognize plans; and discuss its plans, acts, and beliefs. Doing all these tasks in a single coherent 
framework poses evere constraints. We have designed and implemented intensional propositional 
representations forplans. 
We treat acts and plans as mental objects. This enables the modeled agent o discuss, formu- 
late, use, recognize, and reason about acts and plans, which is a major advance over operator- 
based descriptions ofplans. Operator-based formulations ofactions tend to alienate the discussion 
of operators themselves. Operators are usually specified in a different language from that used 
for representing beliefs about states. Moreover, plans (or procedural networks) constructed from 
these operators can only be accessed by specialized programs (critics, executors) and, like op- 
erators, are represented in still another formalism. Our representations for acts, actions, goals, 
and plans build upon and add to the intensional propositional representations of SNePS. This 
framework enables us to tackle various tasks mentioned above in a uniform and coherent fashion. 
Figure 12 shows an example of our representations of plans in SNePS. The node M19 represents 
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Figure 12. A representation for "A plan to stack A on B is to first put B on 
the table and then put A on B." 
the proposition "M18 is a plan to perform the act represented by M17." M17 represents he 
act of performing the action "stack" on A (which is represented by node M15) and B (which is 
represented by node M12). M18is the act ("snsequence") of sequencing two acts Ml l  followed 
by M14. Ml l  represents he act of performing "put" on B and the TABLE, and M14 is the act 
of performing "put" on A and B. Thus M19 is believed by the agent as "A plan to stack A on B 
is to first put B on the table and then put A on B." 
Beliefs are stored as SNePS propositions in the agent's belief space (called a SNeBR context, 
see [5]). SNeBR (the SNePS system for Belief Revision), an assumption-based truth mainte- 
nance system [5,28,31], ensures that the agent's belief space is always consistent. In SNAC'Ibr, 
all interaction with the agent is done using a domain-specific (blocks-world) natural language com- 
ponent. Sentences are parsed by a grammar (written in an ATN) and translated into SNePSUL 
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(the SNePS User Language) commands that form beliefs in the agent's belief space. World-model 
rules for reasoning in the agent's belief space are also translated and represented as agent's beliefs. 
The system is currently being advanced in several directions. See [24,32] for further information. 
5.~. Combining Linguistic and Pictorial Information 
There are many situations where words and pictures are combined to form a communica- 
tive unit; examples in the print media include pictures with captions, annotated iagrams, and 
weather charts. In order for a computer system to synthesize the information from these two 
diverse sources of information, it is necessary to perform the preliminary operations f natural- 
language processing of the text and image interpretation of the associated picture. This would 
result in an initial interpretation of the text and image, following which an attempt at con- 
solidation of the information could be made. Although vision and natural-language processing 
are challenging tasks, since they are severely under-constrained, natural-language processing can 
more easily exploit constraints posed by the syntax of the language than vision systems can ex- 
ploit constraints about he physical world. This fact, combined with the observation that the text 
often describes alient features of the accompanying picture in joint communicative units, leads 
to the idea of using the information contained in the text as a guide to interpreting the picture. 
This research focuses on a method of extracting visual information from text, which results in a 
relational graph describing the hypothesized structure of the accompanying picture (in terms of 
the objects present and their spatial relationships). The relational graph is subsequently used by 
a vision system to guide the interpretation f the picture. A system has been implemented that 
labels human faces in a newspaper photograph, based on information obtained from parsing the 
caption. A common representation in SNePS is used for the knowledge contained in both the 
picture and the caption. The theory is general enough to permit construction of a picture when 
given arbitrary descriptive text (without an accompanying picture). 
Newspaper photographs have all the elements required for a true integration of linguistic 
and visual information. Accompanying captions usually identify objects and provide background 
information which the photograph alone cannot. Photographs, on the other hand, provide visual 
detail which the captions do not. Newspaper captions often identify people in a picture through 
visual detail such as 'Tom Jones, wearing sunglasses ... .  " In order for a computer system to be 
able to identify Tom Jones, it is necessary to understand the visual implication of the phrase 
"wearing sunglasses." The face satisfying all the implied visual constraints could then be labeled 
accordingly. 
The system uses a three-stage process to identify human faces in newspaper photographs. 
Only those photographs whose captions are factual but sometimes incomplete in heir description 
of the photograph are considered. In the first stage, information pertaining to the story is 
extracted from the caption, and a structure of the picture in terms of the objects present and 
spatial relationships between them is predicted. The information contained in this structure 
would be sufficient for generating a picture representing the meaning of the caption. Using this 
information to label faces in an existing picture, however, entails further processing. The second 
stage, which constitutes the vision component, calls on a procedure to locate human faces in 
photographs when the number of faces and their approximate sizes are known. Although the 
second stage locates faces, it does not know whose they are. The last stage establishes a unique 
correlation between ames mentioned in the caption and their corresponding areas in the image. 
These associations are recorded in a SNePS network and enable us to selectively view human 
faces as well as obtain information about them. Input to the system is a digitized image of a 
newspaper photograph with a caption, as in Figure 14. 
Figure 13 illustrates the partial output of the parser on the caption of Figure 14. It postulates 
that four humans, namely Joseph Crowley, Paul Cotter, John Webb, and David Buck, are present 
in the picture (nodes rn38, m42, m46, and mS0). Furthermore, it postulates that Joseph Crow- 
Icy appears above the other three in the picture (since he is "standing"); as represented bynodes 
mS1, m52, and m53. The left to right ordering of the remaining three members i represented 
by the "left-of" relationship in nodes m54 and m55. Factual information obtained from the 
caption (m31) is separated from derived visual information (b12). The hypothesized presence 
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Figure 13. Partial output of the parser on caption of Figure 14. 
of an object in the picture is represented by a node (e.g., m38) with three arcs: COLLECTION, 
referring to the visual model it is part of; TYPE, indicating whether the object is explicitly 
mentioned in the caption or inferred to be present; and MEMBER, pointing to a detailed model 
of this object (e.g., bl0). A node such as m37 provides the link between the visual model of 
an object and the proper name it is associated with (in this case, 'Paul Cotter'). Hypothesized 
spatial relations between objects are represented by a node (e.g., m52) with 3 arcs pointing to 
(a) the type of spatial relation and (b) the nodes representing the two arguments o this binary 
relation. The system returns a labeling of parts of the image corresponding to the faces of the 
people mentioned in the caption, as in Figures 15a and b. See [33,34] for further details. 
5.3. Graphical Deep Knowledge 
During work on the interface of the Versatile Maintenance Expert System (VMES; of. [35,36]), a 
theory of Graphical Deep Knowledge was developed. This representation is ot pixel-oriented but 
combines iconic, meaningful, graphical primitives with propositional information about classes, 
attributes, positions, inheritability, reference frames, etc. Of special interest in this research is 
the use of part hierarchies. In [37,38], a system of three different part hierarchies was developed, 
namely real parts, subassemblies, and subclusters. 
This system of part hierarchies was extended in [39]. In this latest version, parts may either 
be additive, constituting, or replacing. These different part hierarchies differ in their behavior 
k . 
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Figure 14. A newspaper photograph with caption "Wearing their new Celtics 
sunglasses are Joseph Crowley, standing with p~nAnt, and seated from left, 
Paul Cotter, John Webb and David Buck." 
when a graphical representation containing a small amount of detail is extended to c ntain a large 
amount of detail. An additive part is simply added to the previous picture. A set of replacing 
parts forces the removal of the original picture and replaces it with a diagram of all its parts. 
Finally, constituting parts describe an object hat has no form icon of its own. In this case, there 
is no distinction between the two pictures. For more details of this analysis and for details of the 
SNePS representation f these different part hierarchies, the reader is referred to [39]. 
The power of Graphical Deep Knowledge is derived from the fact that most of the graphical 
information is integrated in the normal propositional representation mode of SNePS, so that it 
is possible to perform reasoning tasks about the graphical appearance of the represented objects. 
On the other hand, because the system generates diagrams from the propositional representation 
(and the icons), most changes to the knowledge state of the system can be immediately reflected 
in changes of the graphical appearance of the described objects on the screen. Graphical Deep 
Knowledge therefore permits the easy integration of natural anguage processing and graphics, 
because a common knowledge representation is used. 
Figure 16 shows an example from [37]. This figure was generated from a knowledge base 
containing the SNePS network shown in Figure 17. This picture of the network, in turn, was 
generated according to natural language commands (minimally edited for better understanding). 
The structure under ml  asserts that ship-1 is a ship in the functional display modality. 
(Objects can be displayed in different modalities, e.g., functional or structural. For details, 
see [37].) The structure under m 9- asserts that a ship has (in the functional modality) the form 
ship-form. The node ship-form has a link to a LISP function that, if executed, draws an icon 
that looks like a ship. 
The node m12 defines a coordinate system that is Cartesian, is on the screen, is called 
system-l, and has two axes called s-x and s-y. Node m7 and all the nodes that are logically 
under it (even if they are drawn above it!) define the position of ship-1 in the coordinate system 
system-1 as (200 pixels, 300 pixels) in the directions defined by s-x and s-y. The system makes 
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Figure 15. (a) output of system when asked to displ~Lv Joseph Crowley 
(b) output of system when asked to display Paul Cotter. 
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Figure 16. The ship. 
the simplifying assumption that any 'Tirst axis" specified by the user is parallel to the screen x 
axis. 
Node m3 and the nodes (logically) under it assert that ship-1 is faulty. Node m5 and the 
nodes (logically) under it assert that faultiness is expressed by a rotation of 180 degrees. This 
is the reason why the ship is displayed upside down. The node rotate-jg, similar to the node 
shlp-form, has a functional attachment that rotates an icon by the specified angle. 
It should be pointed out that except for the special meaning of the node SCREEN and 
for the predefined rotation function, all information in this network has been created on the fly, 
either by natural anguage or by a simple, built-in, icon editor. Display requests addressed to 
this system in natural anguage are not parsed into a network representation, but immediately 
executed, resulting in a figure like Figure 16. For more information, see [40]. 
5.4. Knowledge Based Lezicons 
AI systems that involve natural language usually have at least hree different knowledge 
bases: one for domain information, one for language rules, and one for information about words. 
Especially in comparison with domain information, knowledge about words tends to be isolated, 
fragmented, and impoverished. It is isolated, in that much of the information lies in specialized 
structures to which the system's reasoning mechanisms have little or no access, and which must 
be manipulated by specialized (and usually very limited) algorithms. It is fragmented, in that 
most on-line lexicons represent primarily synthetic information. Semantic information, when it is 
present at all, is usually in a separate representation scheme, accessible by different echniques. 
Information which requires both syntax and semantics for its representation usually fallsthrough 
the cracks, as does information which is at least in part semantic, but which is less about the 
world than about the words. It is impoverished, in that all kinds of information tend to be 
represented sketchily, with little apparent concern for giving systems the kinds of information 
about words to which humans have routine access. 
The work discussed in this section involves developing representation schemes for lexical in- 
formation, in which all lexical information is represented in a single, unified SNePS network, 
accessible to the same retrieval and inference mechanisms as domain information. The lexicons 
under discussion are being built using semi-antomated techniques from machine readable dictio- 
naries; the representation is intended to support medium scale (semi-realistic) lexicons for a wide 
range of purposes. (Full, realistic sized lexicons require substantial back-end support because of 
problems of scale.) 
This research is based on the linguistic theory of the relational lexicon [41]. Lexical rela- 
tions provide a formal mechanism for expressing relations among concepts. Traditionally, lexieal 
relations have been approached as a means for representing semantic information about words. 
Our approach extends the theory of lexieal relations to embrace syntactic and morphological s 
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Figure 17. Knowledge base required togenerate Figure 16. 
well as semantic relations. The resulting hierarchy of lexical relations may be thought of as a 
kind of structural primitives, which represent cognitive relations among lexieal items. Informa- 
tion about the lexical relation hierarchy is represented in a SNePS network. Information about 
specific words is integrated into the hierarchy network, resulting in a large network containing a
(potentially dynamic) lexicon, with syntactic, semantic, and morphological information all read- 
ily available. The resulting representation distinguishes among homonym labels, words, strings 
representing word spellings, and word senses, allowing the kinds of reasoning about words that 
people routinely make. The representation used has several unusual features, among them the 
clear importance of path-based inference. 
The relational hierarchy is a fairly straightforward instance of a hierarchical knowledge struc- 
ture. At the present level of development, the most common hierarchical relationships involved 
are most obviously viewed as set membership and subset/superset r lations. The one trap to 
avoid lies in representing the hierarchical information in the same way as one would represent, 
for instance, the information (derived from whatever source, but construed as part of the lexicon) 
that dogs are mammals. 
There is, however, a relatively simple problem of recursion in representation. Since lexical 
relations are themselves objects of knowledge, within the SNePS formalism, they should he rep- 
resented by nodes, not arcs. Now say that we represent the relation between 'Mt. Rushmore' 
and 'mountain' by something like an argl-arg~-rel frame, with a tel arc to a node called some- 
thing like 'member,' which represents the lexieal relation which holds between 'Mt. Rushmore' 
and 'mountain.' Now how do we say that the lexical relation 'member' belongs to the class of 
taxonomic lexical relations? If we try to use the same 'member' node as the first argument and 
also as the relation, we wind up with a pathological proposition ode. 
The reason this is a problem, and not a blunder, is that the lexical relation is not really the 
same thing that holds between itself and its parent class. The problem here is one of distinguishing 
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metalevel information about the lexical relation hierarchy from object level information which 
we use it to represent. We can see the importance of distinguishing them if we look at the 
consequences of trying to use path-based inference to implement inheritance down hierarchical 
subtrees. When we construct a path-based rule to make all object property markers behave alike 
in some respect, we don't want to have to filter for instances of membership like 'Mt. Rnshmore' 
to 'mountain,' or of subset like 'dog' to 'mammal.' 
Figure 18 shows the SNePS representation for a fragment of the lexieal relation hierarchy. 
Throughout the examples, we adopt several node naming conventions for simplicity. Node names 
in all capitals represent members of the lexical relations hierarchy. Proposition odes are num- 
bered beginning with ml  as in other SNePS networks. Other node names in lower ease represent 
word sense nodes. 
Information about words takes several forms. The first, and simplest, is lexical relation 
instances. This information encodes everything from taxonomic classification relations (including 
relations like TAXON, which closely corresponds to the traditional IS-A link, but also synonymy 
relations, antonymy relations, and others) to generic role relations (for instance the Act/Actor 
relation, which holds, e.g., between "bake" and "baker") to morphological nd syntactic relations 
such as the State/Verb relation which holds between anominalized verb and its verb. The second 
kind of information could be viewed as collapsed lexical relations, and covers uch relatively simple 
markers as part of speech (associated with sense nodes), alternate spellings (relation between a
headword node and a string node), and the like. The third reflects information about the sense- 
subsense hierarchy. This is the familiar dictionary definition hierarchy, under which a word may 
have more specific senses which represent refinements o  more general ones. 
We now integrate all three kinds of information about words into the hierarchy network in the 
obvious way. Figure 19 represents a digested form of the information about some words related 
to the most common sense of "sheep" as derived from definitions in Webster's Seventh Collegiate 
Dictionary. Note that this sense of "sheep'!~ has a subsense, which covers only a single species. We 
have omitted all nodes and arcs above the sense level (i.e., headword and string nodes and their 
associated frames) for simplicity, and collapsed parts of the lexical relation hierarchy (especially 
in nodes m4 and mS) to make the figure more readable. 
The resulting lexicon can be used either as stand-alone support for some external activity 
(such as automated query expansion for information retrieval) or as an integral part of the knowl- 
edge base for a natural anguage system. For the second option, which is the more interesting, 
the remaining information in the knowledge base is integrated into the lexicon representation, 
with semantic information relating to senses hanging off the appropriate nodes. The result is a 
knowledge base which not only has ideas and knows what words are typically used to represent 
them (the effect of using something like lex arcs in a more traditional SNePS-ish representation), 
but knows about those words and can reason on the basis of its knowledge. (More detailed 
descriptions of this research are [42-46]). 
5.5. Kinds of Opacity and Their Representations 
Examinations of referential opacity (the failure of certain linguistic ontexts to be "transpar- 
ent" to substitution of equivalents) have almost invariably focused on propositional ttitudes, 
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and even more specifically, on belief sentences. This focus has obscured the fact that there are 
a number of other kinds of sentences in which the logical-linguistic phenomenon of referential 
opacity occurs. In addition to the propositional attitudes, which express an agent's attitude 
towards ome proposition or another, such as 
(1) John believes that the Morning Star is blue, 
there are other kinds of referentially opaque sentences. One of these is attributive adverbs, like 
quickly in 
(2) John swam the river quickly. 
We have proposed a new treatment of attributive adverbs as generating opacity resting on the 
general theory of action proposed by the philosopher Donald Davidson [4?], though he himself 
holds that such adverbs must he excluded from his theory. 
According to Davidson, a verb of action refers to an event, an act. In (2), John performed a
certain act, a swimming of the river. As far as swimmings of the river go, his swimming of it was 
quick. If the time it took John to swim the river is compared to the times it has taken others 
to swim the river, John's time was among the fastest. John's act of swimming the river may, 
however, also be described as a crossing of the river. Thus, we may add the identity statement 
(3) John's swimming of the river is a crossing of the river. 
But though his swimming is a crossing, it does not follow that 
(4) John crossed the river quickly. 
On the contrary, it is very likely that he crossed the river slowly. If the time it took John to 
cross the river is compared to he times it has taken others to cross the river, which will perhaps 
include such modes of crossing as rowing, swinging (on a rope), and driving (on a bridge), John's 
time would no doubt be among the slowest. In other words, when we describe John's act as a 
swimming, it is quick, but when we describe it as a crossing, it is slow. If we accept hat the 
one act cannot be both quick and slow, then the swimming and the crossing cannot be identified 
with the act. In an intensional system, a natural approach to explore is to treat the swimming 
and the crossing as different intensional objects. 
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Figure 20. Representation of (2) and (6). 
The intensional objects to be used in our representations are called aspects, which are remi- 
niscent of Frege's enses [48]. Given a description, d, the Fregean sense associated with it is the 
meaning of d. The aspect associated with d, however, is the result of conceiving of the thing 
d refers to as, or qua, a thing to which the description d applies. Aspects are objects, albeit 
intensional, abstract objects. The general form of an aspect is: 
aspect := object, qua description true of the object 
In [49] this intuitive notion of "qua" is replaced formally using Church's A-abstraction [50]. 
The sentence containing an attributive adverb 
(2) John swam the river quickly, 
is understood as having the logical form 
(5) There is someone bl  named John, there is an action b2 that is 
a swimming, and there is an object b3 that is a member of the 
class of rivers, such that bl  is the agent of b2, and b2 has b3 as 
its direct object, and there is an aspect at--b2, qua mr--which 
is quick. 
Assuming that John's swimming of the river is the same event as his crossing of the river, and 
that 
(6) John crossed the river slowly, 
the representations of (2) and (6) are as in Figure 20. 
No inferences from the properties of an aspect o properties of the object the aspect is an 
aspect of, are permitted. Thus, nothing is said to be both quick and slow, since al (i.e., b2, qua 
being a swimming) is a different aspect from a9 (i.e., bg_, qua being a crossing). (Details are in 
[49]; cf. also [51].) 
5.6. Representing Fiction in SNePS 
As part of the SUNY Buffalo Center for Cognitive Science's project on Cognitive and Computer 
Systems for Understanding Narrative Text, we axe constructing a computational cognitive agent, 
CASSIE, implemented in SNePS, who will be able to read a narrative and comprehend the 
indexical information in it, specifically, where the events in the narrative are taking place (in 
the world of the narrative), when they take place (in the time-line of the narrative), who the 
participants in these events axe (the characters in the world of the narrative), and from whose 
point of view the events and characters are described [52-54]. 
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Background belief: 
(1) Lincoln died in 1865. 
Narrative claim: 
(2) Lincoln was re-elected in 1868. 












Invoke SNeBR: split into 2 contexts 
Net effect: embed (2) in story-operator 
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Figure 21. Example la. 
In order to do this, CASSIE has to be able to (1) read a narrative (in particular, a fictional 
narrative), (2) build a mental-model representation f the story and the story-world, and (3) 
use that mental model to understand and to answer questions about the narrative. To build 
the mental model, she will need to contribute something to her understanding of the story. One 
contribution is in the form of a "deictic center'--a data structure that contains the indexical 
information eeded to track the who, when, and where. 
Another contribution is background knowledge about he real world. For instance, if CASSIE 
is reading a novel about the Civil War, she would presumably bring to her understanding of it 
some knowledge of the Civil War, such as that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th president and was 
assassinated in 1865, even if that information is not explicitly stated in the novel. The novel 
might go on to make other claims about Lincoln, such as that he had a particular conversation 
with General Grant on a particular day in 1860 (even if, in fact, they never talked on that dayP  
this is a novel, after all). Such a claim would probably not be inconsistent with anything CASSIE 
antecedently believed about Lincoln. But some claims in the novel might be thus inconsistent, 
e.g., if she read that Lincoln was re-elected to a third term in 1868. So CASSIE has to be able 
to represent the information presented in the narrative, keep it suitably segregated from her 
background knowledge, yet be able to have information from her antecedent beliefs "migrate" 
into her model of the story world as well as have information from the story world "mi~ate" 
back into her store of beliefs about the real world. 
There have been a number of theories in philosophy about the nature of fictional objects. 
All of these are ontological theories concerned with such questions as: What are fictional ob- 
jects? How can they have properties? How are they related to non-fictional entities? However, 
for the purposes of our project, we need to be more concerned with "epistemological" or pro- 
cessing/computational/interpretive issues: How does a reader understand a (fictional) narrative? 
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How does a reader decide whether and to what extent i  is fictional? How does a reader con- 
struct a mental model of the story world? How does a reader represent fic ional entities and their 
properties? How does a reader integrate his or her knowledge of the real world with what s/he 
reads in the narrative? And so on. Some of these are, indeed, ontological issues, but they are 
what we have elsewhere termed issues in "epistemological ontology" [55]: Corresponding to the 
purely or metaphysically ontological question, "What are fictional objects?", we ask the episte- 
mologically ontological question, "How does a cognitive agent represent fictional objects?". And 
corresponding to the purely ontological question, "How are properties predicated of fictional ob- 
jects?", we ask the epistemologically ontological question, "How does a cognitive agent represent 
the properties of fictional objects?". 
In order for CASSIE to read a narrative, the knowledge representations she should construct 
will include a story operator (like [56] or [57]), only one mode of predication of properties to 
(fictional) objects (like [58]), and only one kind of property (like [59,60]). It must be kept in 
mind that all entities represented in CASSIE's mind are just that---entities in her mind--not 
entities some of which are real and some of which are fictional. 
The story operator will set up a "story space" that is formally equivalent to a belief space 
(cf. [3,61,62]). It will allow CASSIE to distinguish her own beliefs about London from (her beliefs 
about) claims made about London in a story in precisely the same way that belief spaces allow 
CASSIE to distinguish er own beliefs about Lucy from her beliefs about John's beliefs about 
Lucy (cf. [2,61]). 
But how should this be handled? Consider Figure 21. Suppose that one of CASSIE's back- 
ground beliefs is that Lincoln died in 1865 and that she reads in a narrative that Lincoln was 
re-elected in 1868. There is a processing problem: CASSIE is faced with an inconsistency. There 
are two solutions. First, the SNePS Belief Revision system (SNeBR; [5]) can be invoked. The 
detection of the inconsistency will cause a split to be made into two (consistent) contexts. But 
note that the net effect of this is to embed the second statement (the re-election in 1868) in a 
story operator. So why not start with a story operator in the first place? This is the second 
solution, as shown in Figure 22. 
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Backeround beliefs: 
(1) Lincoln was the 16th president. 
(2) Lincoln died in 1865. 
Narrative claim: 
(3) Lincoln was re-elected in 1868. 
Pro¢¢ssinf problem?: 
Want (1) to "carry over" to story world. 
NO problem~; (1), (2) are believed by Cassie; 
(1) is believed by her & in story world 
~ 
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But now let's complicate the data a bit. Consider Figure 23. Suppose that CASSIE's back- 
ground beliefs include both that Lincoln was the 16th president and that Lincoln died in 1865, 
and suppose once again that CASSIE reads in a narrative that Lincoln was re-elected in 1868. 
The processing "problem" here (it is not really a problem) is that we want the first of CASSIE's 
two background beliefs to "migrate into" the story world. The reason that this is not a problem 
is that those first two background beliefs are CAS$IE's beliefs and the third is not. The first one 
(that Lincoln was 16th president) is both believed by CASSIE and is in the story world. 
Consider Figure 24. If CASSIE knows that she is reading a narrative, we want it to he the 
case that she believes (1) (that Washington was the first president), and we want both (1) and 
(2) (that he chopped own the cherry tree) to be in the story world. How do we accomplish this? 
By starting with a story operator n (2). In general, we will put a story operator on all narrative 
predications. 
But then we face two problems: Background beliefs of the reader are normally brought o 
bear on understanding the story, as we saw in Figure 21 and Figure 22 (cf. [53]). And we often 
come to learn (or, at least, come to have beliefs) about the real world from reading fictional 
narratives. Thus, we need to have two rules: 
(R1) Propositions outside the story space established by the story operator (i.e., antecedently 
believed by the reader) are assumed, when necessary, to hold within that story space by 
default and defeasibly. 
(R2) Propositions inside the story space are assumed, when necessary, to hold outside that story 
space by default and defeasibly. 
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N~rrptive claim: 
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Proce~ing problem: 
In narrative, both have to be treated alike; 




/ down a \ 
/ cherry tree / 
J president I 
Figure 24. Example 3. 
Some comments: The "when necessary" clause i  there to prevent an explosion in the size of 
belief and story spaces; the migrations permitted by these two rules would only take place on an 
as-needed basis for understanding the story or for understanding the world around us. The "by 
default" clause is there for obvious reasons: we wouldn't want to have Lincoln's dying in 1865 
migrate into a narrative in which he is re-elected in 1868. The "defeasibly" clause is there to 
undo any damage that might be done at a later point in the narrative if such a migration had 
taken place, innocently, at an earlier point. Rule (R1) aids in our understanding of the story. 
Rule (1L2) allows us to enlarge our views of the world from reading literature, while also allowing 
us to segregate our real-world beliefs from our story-world beliefs. 
In the Examples, we have used the linguist's triangle to hide irrelevant details, hut it is worth 
showing how the story operator looks in detail. This is shown in Figure 25. For more details, 
see [63,64]. 
5. 7. Natural Category Systems 
We have developed representations for atural category systems based on a F~schian model of 
categories that has been extended to accommodate he recent categorization research of Barsa- 
lou [65-67], Nell [68], Medin [69,70], Neisser [71], and Lakoff [72]. We take issue with the assump- 
tion, implicit in most artificial intelligence (AI), natural anguage processing (NLP) systems that 
generic concepts can be viewed simply as collections of attributes. Rather, richer representations 
are needed to explain conceptual coherence and the richness of conceptual structure [67-70,72]; 
i.e., categories are further structured by deeper conceptual relations and organized by core princi- 
ples; lists of attributes fail to capture interproperty (intraconcept) and interconcept relations. We 
believe that these deeper conceptual relations encode commonsense knowledge about the world 
necessary to support natural anguage understanding. 
Our system uses default generalizations to represent facts about the typical exemplars or 
members of a category. Thus, a basic level category in our semantic network is, in part, a collec- 
tion of default generalizations about part/whole structure, image schematic structure, additional 
percepts, and functional and interactional properties. Figure 26 shows the default rule that can 




of In bl, P; 
bl is "<story>"; )<stow> I stow> 
bl is a <kind of story> 
Figure 25. The story operator. 
be paraphrased as: For all z, if z is a car, then typically x has an engine or, more simply, as: 
2~jpically, cars have ngines. 
We build many such default generalizations about he basic level category car; i.e., generAli~.s- 
tions about typical parts and other attributes. It may seem cumbersome to build such a default 
rule to represent a generic sentence such as: cars have engines; why not just build a prototypical 
cat that has an engine? Although we want to capture prototype ffects in our repreaentations, 
we agree with Rosch [73] and Lakoff [72] that the existence of these effects merely indicates 
that prototypes must have some place in theories of representation, processing, and learning of 
categories. 
As people's knowledge increases, they come to reject mere collections of surface attributes 
and other typical features as being adequate to specify concepts [67-70]. Our current hypothesis 
is that basic level categories start out as perceptual categories; in this stage of development 
the knowledge associated with categories consists of default generalizations about surface parts 
and other perceptual attributes. As learning and development proceed, additional conceptual 
relations based on theories and causal mental models further structure these categories and 
attributes; i.e., our knowledge becomes organized by core principles. 
We build additional default rules for these "deeper" conceptual relations. Thus, in addition 
to part-whole relations (m5 in Figure 26) and relations about other percepts, we structure basic 
level categories such as car with enabling, functional, and spatial relations uch as those shown 
in Figures 27-29. (We have not shown the entire default rules, just the additional conceptual 
relations; i.e., mS, mg, and ml l  would replace mS, the part-whole relation, in the default rule 
of Figure 26, creating three additional, similar default rules.) Figure 27 shows a slmtial relation 
that further structures the parts of ear, which can be paraphrased as engines are inside (or 
interior parts) of cars. We structure the external parts of car similarly. Figure 28 is used to 
further structure or cluster mechanical parts of cars, such as the brakes and engine, and can 
be paraphrased as engines are mechanical parts of cars (together with mT). Figure 29 shows 
an enabling relation: engines enable cars to run/go. Thus, in our system, there will be many 
m7: for all x, if m2, 
then typically m6 
m2: x is a car 
m6: there exists a y 
such that m5 and m4 
m5: y is a pan of x 
m4: y is an engine 
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Figure 26. The following defines a path to find all the parts 
of basic-level objects: (def-path parts (compose arg2- arK1 par t -  whole 





Figure 27. Engines are interior parts of cars. 
assertions linking car and engine: the knowledge associated with a basic level category such as 
car is highly interconnected an  organized by spatial, temporal, causal, explanatory, and enabling 
relations. 
In our system, concepts are not invariant structures retrieved intact from long-term emory 
(LTM), but rather axe constructed in working memory (WM), tailored to a particular linguistic 
context on a particular occasion, i.e., different information associated with a category in LTM is 
incorporated in the temporary concept constructed in WM in different contexts. Categorizing an 
entity provides access to a large amount of information; however, only a small subset of the in- 
formation associated with a category in LTM is incorporated in a temporary concept constructed 
in WM. Category knowledge in our system is relatively unorganized, interrelated knowledge that 
can be used to construct temporary concepts in WM, appropriate to the current task and context. 
When a new individual identified by its basic level name (e.g., a car) or a generic basic 




Figure 28. Eng~a~ are mechanical parts of car l  
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car action engine 
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Fi N 29, EnOn~ e~u~ble cars to run. 
dependent satellite entities implicitly evoked by hearing/reading the category name are placed 
in WM.  We believe that these reflex, or subconscious, inferences are made at the time of read- 
ing/hearing the central basic level category name. The SNePS path-based inference package 
provides the subconscious reasoning that is required for implicit focusing of satellite entities. 
The definition of appropriate paths in the network enables the automatic retrieval of the relevant 
satellite concepts of basic level concepts. Thus, we use the additional structure provided by the 
intraconcept and interconcept relations, defining paths in the network that retrieve external parts 
after processing input such as: Lucy washed her car; interior, mechanical parts after processing 
input such as: The mechanic repaired the car; and enabling satellite entities (e.g., a mortgage) 
after processing: Lucy bought a new house. For additional information on this topic, see [74-77]. 
6. CURRENT AVAILABIL ITY  AND REQUIREMENTS 
SNePS 2.1 is implemented in Common Lisp, and has run on a variety of platforms, including 
Symbolics Lisp Machines, Texas Instruments Explorer Lisp Machines, SUN workstations, an 
Aliant Multimax, and DEC VAXes running VMS.  
SNePS 2.1 is currently available via a license agreement with the Research Foundation of 
State University of New York. There is a minimal handling fee for non-profit research la~ and 
educational institutions. The license fee for for-profit organizations is negotiable. For information 
and a copy of the license agreement, send name, address and telephone number to the first author 
of this article. 
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